The Modi 3.0 coalition government: challenges and priorities

ON 9 June, Narendra Modi was sworn in as India’s prime minister for a third consecutive term, unprecedented in 62 years.

A day later, the government’s top four ministers – for defence, home affairs, finance and external affairs – and the powerful national-security advisor were reappointed to their posts, signalling stability and continuity from the previous government. Modi’s party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), holds 240 seats, a plurality in the lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha).

The BJP is in power in 13 of India’s 29 provinces which possess legislative assemblies, with its allies ruling in an additional six provinces. 

Yet the new Modi government is weaker than its predecessor, having failed unexpectedly to secure a majority in the Lok Sabha. The BJP lost 63 seats from its previous tally achieved in 2019 (303), falling 32 short of a majority (272 seats). With the support of its coalition partners, which provided an additional 53 seats, it was able to form a coalition government as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), but it now relies on the support of these partners to govern.  

The BJP’s losses were primarily in Uttar Pradesh (29 seats), Maharashtra (14) and West Bengal (six), accounting for a total of 49 seats. These losses were likely the result of multiple local factors rather than any single national issue.

The BJP’s loss in Uttar Pradesh in the north can be attributed to voters’ perceptions of the BJP’s arrogance, the party’s failure to address rising unemployment and inflation, and its anti-Muslim rhetoric (employed to seek the Hindu vote by polarising communities).

The BJP’s defeat in the Faizabad constituency, home to the recently constructed temple to the Hindu god Ram in Ayodhya, which had long been the locus of sectarian tensions, showed this push-back. There was also concern among the low-caste Dalit voters about the BJP’s perceived intention to roll back affirmative-action policies if it secured a resounding victory.  

In Maharashtra, the BJP failed to address discontent among the agrarian community and concerns among the Maratha and Dalit communities and underestimated the political skills of local opposition leaders. In West Bengal, the BJP’s polarising communal rhetoric failed amidst internal party disagreements and the absence of a credible local leader.  

Domestic political changes 

The BJP’s dependence on its principal coalition partners, the southern Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the eastern Janata Dal (United) (JD (U)), is likely to result in changes to the government’s domestic political programme.

Both these regional parties tout their secular ideologies and have Muslim and Other Backward Class (OBC; a classification of castes that are perceived as educationally or socially backward) vote-banks, contradicting the BJP’s majoritarian Hindutva politics.

One of Modi’s signature initiatives – a Uniform Civil Code that would constrain traditional Muslim practices related to marriage, divorce and other personal matters – will now likely be deferred, while the controversial Agnipath Scheme, which allows young people to enlist in the armed forces for four-year tours of duty, will be reassessed. Also likely to be shelved is the BJP’s manifesto pledge to implement simultaneous state and national elections under ‘One Nation One Election’, which most regional parties view as a violation of the federal system. 

Political stability may also be an issue. For now, the BJP has ensured that only five of the 30 ministerial positions in the cabinet are held by members of the coalition parties, with the top four ministerial portfolios continuing to be held by the BJP.

Of the 72 members of the Union Council of Ministers, 11 are drawn from the BJP’s coalition partners. Some coalition partners are already resentful, however, and seek an expansion of the ministerial council. Both the TDP and the JD (U) have been fickle partners, having both previously been members of the opposition coalition (the TDP rejoined the NDA in March 2024 and the JD (U) in January 2024).

Moreover, following the elections, the Indian National Congress (INC)-led Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance is emboldened, having won 232 seats (with the INC nearly doubling its tally from 52 to 99 seats).  

Now facing a stronger opposition, the BJP-led NDA can expect its domestic and foreign policies to receive greater scrutiny. Yet a previous BJP-led government, under prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, held just 182 seats in the Lok Sabha and successfully completed its five-year term (1999–2004) with the support of coalition partners. To run a successful coalition government, the BJP leadership will need to be more accommodative while not appearing weak.  

Economic and foreign-policy priorities 

In her first press briefing following the election, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman highlighted that reforms would continue in order to provide the macroeconomic stability and growth required to achieve the BJP’s ‘Viksit Bharat Sankalp’ action plan – which aims to transform India into a developed country by 2047.

The Modi 3.0 coalition government is expected to continue to invest in construction of major infrastructure, including roads, airports, ports and solar power; improving India’s ranking on ease-of-doing-business indices; and strengthening the domestic manufacturing base. The government’s long-term goal is to double India’s share of global manufacturing from 5% in 2030 to 10% in 2047, the centenary of India’s independence.

More immediately, it remains likely that India will surpass Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2027–28. However, Modi’s aggressive land- and labour-reform agendas could stall due to coalition politics, with the regional parties likely to seek special incentives for their provinces. 

India’s foreign-policy priorities are unlikely to change. Its commitment to maintaining its ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ was demonstrated by the presence of seven heads of government of regional countries (those of Pakistan and China were not invited) at Modi’s swearing-in ceremony. This included the president of Maldives, where efforts to secure the departure of Indian military personnel from the country have recently strained relations.  

With the BJP’s coalition partners having limited interest in or influence on foreign-policy issues, New Delhi is likely to maintain its policies of both strategic autonomy (a key component of which will be a focus on domestic manufacturing for key weapons and technologies) and multi-alignment, with the US as India’s principal strategic partner.  

China and Pakistan will continue to be India’s primary security concerns. In his first media interaction following the election, Minister of External Affairs Dr Subramanyam Jaishankar reiterated the need for stability on the India–China land border following the violent clashes that have taken place there since 2020. Modi took the unprecedented step of responding directly to a congratulatory message from the new Taiwanese president, Lai Ching-te, on the social-media platform X, resulting in a formal complaint by China.  

Jaishankar also noted the need to find a solution to the terrorism emanating from Pakistan, saying that such activity could not be a policy of a ‘good neighbour’. He made this comment without referring to the terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir that took place as Modi was being sworn in, which killed nine people. In response to a congratulatory message from Pakistan’s leadership, Modi signalled that India’s stance on terrorism remained strong.  

By Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Sofiya Azad